A 2008 poll of Iranians revealed that approximately twenty-four percent of those surveyed support the development nuclear weapons by Iran, while seventy-four percent of those surveyed support the development of exclusively peaceful nuclear capabilities. This essay develops an argument that explains why Iranians hold different views on nuclear weapons. We contend that the elite discourse on the legitimacy of nuclear weapons within a nation will play a very large role in shaping public attitudes on the development of such weapons. In post-revolution Iran, ruling elites have invoked Islam to shape the discourse on nuclear weapons, and top clerics have argued that Islam forbids the development of such weapons. Thus we would expect that acceptance or rejection of this view of nuclear weapons will be the primary factor explaining an Iranian's support for or opposition to their development. Our regression analyses indicate that a respondent's views on whether Islam tolerates the development of nuclear weapons explain, in large measure, the observed variation in Iranian support for developing nuclear weapons.
Given the high stakes of Iran's nuclear brinkmanship, a number of organizations have undertaken polling of the Iranian public in order to assess the degree to which Iran's citizenry supports the development of nuclear weapons. 6 All of these polling efforts and/or residual products present only tabulations which are geared to producing media headlines. They offer few if any explanatory insights about why Iranians support the development of nuclear weapons. 7 Furthermore, with one exception, noted below, the firms that do such work in Iran do not make respondent-level data available freely to the public and thus scholars have no recourse but to rely on their unsatisfactory analyses.
This essay hopes to advance scholarly understanding of Iranian popular support for Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons. 8 To do so, we use respondent-level data made available to our team by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA). This study uses that organization's most recent data, derived from a . As the authors of that paper note, they confronted a serious technical issue, as the data they used, from the 2006 survey of Iranians conducted by the United States Institute of Peace and the Program on International Policy Attitudes, split the sample on key questions pertaining to support for the program. Fair and Shellman tested the hypothesis that those with "realist" views on foreign policy would be more supportive of developing nuclear weapons. This paper differs from the previous one in that it uses an improved sample and offers a new argument about the role of religion in shaping attitudes toward nuclear weapons. 8 It should be stated at the outset that there is considerable debate about whether the Iranian government actually intends to acquire weapons. Iran claims that it is developing peaceful (e.g. civilian) nuclear capabilities, consistent with the rights and privileges conferred on signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran is a signatory of the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which oversees NPT compliance, has repeatedly reported that Iran has not satisfactorily addressed IAEA information that suggests that the country may in fact have a nuclear weapons program. IAEA Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency, 25 February 2011; El Baradei, The Age of Deception. One of the key concerns is Iran's level of uranium enrichment, which has reached 20 percent. This indicates its ability to enrich to weapons-grade levels. While the IAEA has not reported that any materials have been diverted to a weapons program, itcontinues to detail the numerous NPT obligations that Iran refuses to meet. IAEA Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement." This paper does not seek to intervene in these technical discussions about Iran's intentions but rather to explore popular support for weaponization. nuclear weapons and, equally important, why they do or do not. This effort will enable analysts to discern with greater clarity the distance that exists between the regime's position on key policy questions and the views of the diverse public over which it rules.
Our analysis finds that a majority of Iranians support Iran's right to develop a full civil nuclear power cycle. There is, however, a significant minority that prefers that Iran develop a weapons capability. Curiously, when other factors are controlled, fear of the United States does not explain public support for weaponization.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we address an important prerequisite to this query: whether or not public opinion matters in authoritarian states like Iran. We argue that it does. Next, we review the available literature on dominant elite discourse, which helps in some measure to explain why some Iranians may want their country to acquire a weapons capability. We draw several hypotheses from this literature, which we will test using our survey data. Third, we describe the data and methods employed in this survey. The penultimate section of this paper details the analytical results. Finally, we conclude by discussing several implications of our analysis.
Does Popular Opinion Matter in Authoritarian States?
An important, if ultimately unanswerable, question is whether or not Iranian public opinion matters in influencing the decisions of the authoritarian regime. 9 There are compelling reasons to believe it does.
Iran's regime has invested considerable resources in securing and sustaining popular support to maintain regime legitimacy. Iran regularly conducts elections at federal and sub-national levels (although the candidates must be approved by the regime's Council of Guardians), reflecting the importance of popular attitudes on domestic and foreign policy issues. Elections at the sub-national level are less closely controlled, and thus Iranians tend to view these elections as more genuinely reflecting the public's preference. 10 The importance of the Iranian street was made evident in 2009, when widespread protests broke out following President Ahmadinejad's victory in a flawed election. While the mass gatherings initially were confined to expressing support for his reformist challenger, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, they soon transformed into the "Green Revolution," which challenged the regime's very legitimacy. In a further embarrassment to the regime, Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, supports the Green Movement, as do almost all of his descendants. 11 This mobilization, which episodically resurfaces, has unsettled the government and spurred it to use ever-more coercive means of repression. 12 As further evidence of the importance of public opinion, the regime has energetically cultivated popular support for its controversial nuclear aspirations, variously defined but usually described as developing a "full nuclear fuel cycle" rather than a nuclear weapons capability. This has been most evident during the tenure of President Ahmadinejad. He has successfully pulled the debate about Iran's nuclear policy out of the discrete purview of policy elites and into the public domain. In doing so, he has framed the nuclear issue as one of "national independence that would stymie foreign powers seeking to deprive Iran of its rightful place-as a major international and technological power." 13 By most accounts, he has been successful.
Numerous polls of Iranians find that, among Iran's political elite and general public alike, there is a near unanimous belief that Iran should have a "full nuclear fuel cycle." 14 Iran's path to weaponization might resemble that of India, which maintained that it was only developing a civilian capacity up to the day in 1998 that it actually tested a weapon. 15 U.S. policy also assumes that Iranian public opinion matters. The previous Bush administration explicitly sought to reach out to the Iranian public, which it believed to be amenable to regime change. In 2005, the U.S. Congress passed the Iran Freedom and Support Act of 2005, which appropriated $10 million and to fund groups opposed to the Iranian government. President Bush praised the allocation of these socalled 'regime change funds' as the first step in promoting popular efforts to overthrow Iran's theocratic government and to forge a liberal democracy in its place. More recently, Twitter (a social network that allows users to quickly pass small messages to large groups) emerged as a key tool in organizing the Green Movement demonstrations. Coincidentally, Twitter had previously scheduled a major update, which would have taken the service off-line, for a date shortly after the protests began. The U.S. State Department, in a radical departure from its usual practice, asked Twitter to delay the upgrade to facilitate further popular mobilization. 16 Regime efforts to shut down the social networking tool failed. This underscores the value of public opinion both to the regime and to outside forces seeking to mobilize the public in order to create political upheaval.
While polls of the Iranian public proliferate, there is no theoretical literature that explores how relevant public opinion is to the policy choices of an authoritarian regime. While several studies have explored the regime's likely course of action with respect to developing a nuclear weapons capability and what factors might shape its decisions, this body of literature on state motives cannot easily be applied to the question of publics approve of or reject a policy. Moreover, there is little theoretical guidance on which polling techniques are more suitable for gauging public attitudes within highly constrained authoritarian regimes, where respondents may fear that participating in a survey or answering particular questions in specific ways will attract unwanted attention. Consequently, some firms field their surveys using phone-interviews from callcenters within or outside Iran, while others use face-to-face techniques. As discussed below, while proponents of each method tend to argue for the superiority of their approach, both have strengths and weaknesses.
Explaining Iranian Opinion on Developing Nuclear Weapons: The Importance of the Dominant Elite Discourse
As the Iranian regime contemplates the scope and goals of its nuclear program, there is every reason to believe that the policy-makers involved have weighed the pros and cons of developing nuclear weapons, taking into account all pertinent information, much of it not available to Iran's public. It is equally reasonable to assume that the Iranian public does not deliberate in the same way, if for no other reason than this information asymmetry. 17 Myriad analyses of foreign policy attitudes have found that the public, in every country under study, is not well informed about foreign policy issues. Early studies of public attitudes about foreign policy issues argued that these mass attitudes lacked consistency and coherence. 18 Subsequent studies found that foreign policy attitudes are more structured than originally assumed, 19 but that those attitudes are not based on highly developed models that tie complex aspects of foreign and security policy issues together. These more recent studies have found that the average person is a "cognitive miser" when it comes to processing information about security policy, taking cognitive short-cuts to understanding complex issues. 20 If the typical citizen of any country does not know much about security policy issues, how does she form her views? Public opinion researchers have argued that societal and political elites play a very large role in shaping what the public thinks about policy issues, particularly policy issues they do not understand very well. Zaller, 21 in a seminal book on the origins of public attitudes, argues that elites play a large role in framing issues and shaping their presentation in the mass media and public discourse. While this is true in a democracy, their role would be even more important in an authoritarian system, where the governing elite would have near or complete control over the media. The mass public most often assumes that the elites have better information on issues than they themselves do, and take their cues on complex issues from those whom they consider knowledgeable. 22 As Lupia argues, 23 the more expert an elite is assumed to be on an issue, the more likely it is that citizens will follow its cues on issues that are deemed to be in the elite's realm of expertise.
Elites may use any number of arguments to garner public support for the elites' positions regarding nuclear weapons. These arguments may be based on security considerations, secular ethics, or appeals to national pride, religion, or other values. 24 Strategically, one would expect elites to use public appeals that they think will engender public support for the elite's position on nuclear weapons, no matter the real reason the elites want to develop such weapons. It is possible that, at times, those appeals to public support are sincere, while at other times they are meant as smoke-screens for the elites' real intentions. From an ideological and juridical perspective, we consider developing nuclear weapons unlawful. We consider using such weapons a big sin. We also believe that keeping such weapons is futile and dangerous and we will never go after them (Economist May 19, 2012 What is the importance of the fact that Khomenei and Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leaders and its most important voices on religion, have publicly stated that Islam forbids the development of nuclear weapons? Having the most influential cleric in the country pronounce the development of nuclear weapons "haram," or forbidden in Islam, would likely play a large role on shaping public attitudes among a people that takes its religious identity quite seriously. 37 The more authoritative the religious figure making the pronouncement on a foreign policy issue, the more likely that his view will be adopted by many within the public, particularly if the public is prone to be receptive to religious arguments.
Increasingly, research has shown that religious arguments about security policy and other political issues do resonate in societies with significant numbers of religious citizens. 38 This is particularly true in Islamic societies where Islam has deep roots and where much of society takes its religion very seriously; and it is certainly true in Iran.
Since Ayatollah Khamenei is the supreme religious leader in Iran, he would be particularly well- A related idea is that those Iranians who support the use of force to further Iran's national interests, at home or abroad, will be more supportive of the idea of developing Iranian nuclear weapons. Wittkopf 40 has argued that those who believe that use of force abroad is ethical are more supportive of the use of nuclear weapons. Iranians who have such a view of the broad legitimacy of the use of force could believe that all means of maximizing the power of that force, including nuclear weapons, are to be developed to help Iran achieve its interests.
The following sections of this paper are devoted to exploring these ideas through empirical analysis.
Data and Methods
The data used to test the aforementioned set of hypotheses comes from a 2008 PIPA survey. PIPA fielded its survey, along with Search for Common Ground (SCG), in Iran using face-to-face surveys of 710 respondents between January 13 and February 9, 2008. Overall, the survey's margin of error is +/-3.8%.
PIPA used a multistage stratified, province-based sample. 41 While the data, collected in 2008, may seem dated, the basic issues have not changed since that time.
Iran still faces the same international issues it faced in 2008 (albeit some of them with more urgency). But the Iranian government has not changed its public stance on nuclear weapons nor, from our perspective, has it changed its position that the development of nuclear weapons is forbidden by Islam. Thus, since the context of the nuclear weapons issue has not changed that much, we believe this data still gives us valid and important insights into the Iranian public's thinking on nuclear weapons. It is also highly unlikely that there will be any more public-opinion polling, with publicly available data, carried out in Iran in the near future due to the regime's sensitivity about foreigners asking such questions in a highly charged political environment. 44 In order to test the hypotheses developed in this study and alternative potential explanations, we perform a logistic regression using data from the 2008 PIPA Iran Survey. Using Gary King's Clarify program for Monte Carlo simulations, we additionally examine first differences to determine the relative magnitude of the significant independent variables in explaining the variance in our dependent variables. This statistic lets us directly compare which of the significant independent variables has the strongest influence on the dependent variable. The number of respondents in the original sample was 710. We use a sub-sample of that, which has removed the don't know/no response (DK/NR) responses from the original sample. This leaves with a sample of 328 respondents for the analysis. Given the potential trepidations faced by respondents when deciding whether to answer some of the questions related to U.S.-Iranian relations and nuclear weapons, we opted to not utilize any data imputation methods. Without being able to ascertain whether respondents were genuinely acknowledging a lack of opinion or choosing to not express an 43 Terror Free Tomorrow conducted a poll in Iran in 2009 that asked a pair of questions about support for nuclear weapons development, but that data is proprietary and not available for analysis. 44 Even survey groups that try to call into Iran from the outside or make calls within Iran are finding it nearly impossible to do so because of the intense scrutiny from the regime and Iranians' fear of answering sensitive questions in an environment of coercion. opinion they hold, we believe any imputation method would potentially misrepresent the responses and cloud our analysis and findings.
As is clear from the reduction in size of the original sample to the N that was used in the analysis, a substantial number of cases were lost due to respondents choosing the don't know and refusal responses (which were collapsed into one category during the initial response coding). In order to determine if this produced a systematic bias, we ran a correlation matrix of the variables included in the analysis to determine what was most highly correlated with DK/NRs. Table 1 shows the nature of the correlations. Table 1 about here
The correlation matrix shows that the categories of female and not living in Tehran are correlated with the DK/NR category. This finding suggests an explanation of the DK/NR responses: women in Iran, while comparatively well-educated in comparison to some other states in the region, are not as likely to be as politically engaged and feel less politically efficacious than men. 45 This is particularly true in a highly patriarchal society such as Iran. Thus, Iranian women are more likely to think that they are not prepared to answer questions on an issue such as nuclear weapons policy.
It is also logical that Iranians who live outside of Iran would be less likely than residents of Tehran to respond to the security policy questions in this survey. We know from previous public opinion research that rural Iranians are generally less politically engaged and aware than citizens who reside in more urban areas. 46 Thus, those Iranians who live in smaller towns or villages are more likely to be parochial in their political outlook and poorly-informed about issues related to international affairs. This would increase the probability that rural Iranians would feel less comfortable answering questions related to national security policy. What we can gather from these results is that a majority of respondents are satisfied with the status quo. Over 70% of respondents approve of the current Iranian nuclear policy. We do see, however, that just under a quarter of respondents would like to see Iran expand its nuclear program to include weapons. Given that we are most interested in assessing the differences between those who favor Iranian nuclear weapons and those who do not, we code as 0 both those respondents who do not support the full fuel cycle nuclear energy program and those who support that program, but not weaponization. Supporters of nuclear weapons development are coded as 1.
The Independent Variables
In light of the previous work on the Iranian public's attitudes towards nuclear policy and foreign policy in general, we examine several rival explanations within our model. The first category of explanation focuses on an individual's sense of threat from other countries. We hypothesize that Iranians who view other countries as threats will be more likely to support the development of nuclear weapons. We utilize several measures to test this argument. One explores the threat the United States poses to Islam, the religion of the vast majority of Iranians. To measure this within our analysis, we 47 This question is problematic because the respondents are first primed with a statement about Iran's official position (e.g. developing a full nuclear fuel cycle) and then asked whether they agree with this program or support weaponization. The structure of the question may influence what respondents believe about the country's actual policy and/or bias them towards supporting the status quo position. Ideally, we would have preferred a question that simply asked respondents if they believe Iran should develop nuclear weapons, pursue a non-weaponized full fuel cycle, among other options. While we cannot ascertain the degree to which respondents' answers were affected by the question design, we are aware that the question is problematic. However, it is the only question that allows us to operationalize our dependent variable. In addition to the independent variables suggested by our three categories, we include controls for four variables as part of our models. Education is assessed through a question that asks: Please tell me what is the highest class in school you have completed. Respondents were given the options of: Less than primary (0), primary (1), less than high school diploma (2), high school diploma (3), some college/university (4), bachelor's degree or higher (5).
Respondents were asked their income, which was then recoded and scaled to: very low (0), low (1), average/median (2), high (3), and very high (4). Given the previously discussed concerns of sampling in Iran, we include controls for location. We dummy code respondents that live in Tehran (1) as opposed to any other region of the country (0). Given Ahmadinejad's time as mayor of the city and the fact that Tehran residents are more exposed to politics, it is important to control for these potential differences. The control for age is broken into four categories: 25 and under (0), 26-35 years old (1), 36-50 years old (2), and 51 and over (3). Lastly, we control for gender with men coded as 1 and women coded as 0. Table 2 summarizes our hypotheses and their corresponding operationalizations. Table 2 about here Given that many of the independent variables ask respondents questions that could have answers based on similar values, it is important that we assure multicollinearity is not an issue in the specification of our model. Table 3 reports the correlations between all of the independent variables used in our model. Attack U.S. Civilians and Attack U.S. Employees correlate highly (rho = .63). There is, however, still a substantial amount of variation between them. Likewise, Tehran and income are highly correlated (.44) but is explained by the geographic disparity of income within the country. Table 4 presents the variance inflation factor scores for the independent variables included in the model. All are below the typical threshold of 10 for excessive collinearity. Table 4 about here As a result of the correlation matrix and the VIF scores, we do not believe collinearity is an issue for our specified model of analysis.
Results of the Analysis
The logistic regression analyses results for our model are presented in Table 5 . Table 5 about here Model one examines just our explanatory variables while model two looks at the explanatory variables along with the controls. Both models have similar results as regards our explanatory predictors. We find support for two of three categories of explanation: threats from other countries and religious considerations. The threats from other countries category produced one significant variable (out of four). At the .05 level of significance, we find that Iranians who believe there are a large number of secret nuclear programs in the world are more likely to want their nation to also adopt nuclear weapons. Our results indicate that fears of U.S. bases in the Middle East, fears of a U.S. attack on nuclear sites in Iran, and the U.S. seeking to humiliate Islam are not significant predictors.
The morality of the use of force explanation, which included four variables in our analysis, did not prove to be a useful means of predicting support for the development of nuclear weapons in Iran. The variables that focus on providing weapons to Iraqis fighting Americans, attacking U.S. civilians working in Muslim countries, attacking U.S. civilians in the United States, and whether Iran should expand its power and influence did not yield statistically significant results.
The third category of explanation, the role of religion in shaping Iranian views on nuclear weapons development, was a powerful predictor of support for developing nuclear weapons. The question dealing with the compatibility of the development of nuclear weapons with Islam yielded a highly significant coefficient. As predicted, those Iranians who believe that Islam permits the development of nuclear weapons were more likely to support the Iranian government developing such weapons.
Four of our control variables emerged as significant predictors, which explains the difference in robustness between models one and two. We find that women, younger Iranians, Tehran residents, and less educated individuals are more likely to want Iran to move toward developing nuclear weapons. Income did not prove to be a significant predictor.
Given that we use logit, the coefficients reported in Table 5 do not represent the marginal effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables. As a result, we report the first differences of our significant independent variables in Table 4 as well. The first difference reported measures the probability of the dependent variable, signifying a desire to see Iran move toward developing nuclear weapons, as the independent variable of interest moves from its minimum to its maximum value, with all remaining independent variables held at their means. This allows us to consider the substantive significance of each independent variable to explaining variation in the dependent variable. When looking at the model, we see that the perceived compatibility of the development of nuclear weapons with Islam proved to have the largest first difference: .299. That means that increasing the value of this variable from its minimum to maximum while holding all other variables constant creates a 29.9% increase in the probability that the respondent would want Iran to develop nuclear weapons. The variable that measured an Iranian's views on the likelihood of other countries developing secret nuclear programs produced a first difference of .130.
Conclusions
This essay analyzed what the Iranian mass public believes about Iran potentially developing nuclear weapons. Moreover, in some measure, it explained how and why Iranians differ on these matters. We argued that the elite narrative about nuclear weapons would likely play the most important role in shaping Iranian opinions on weaponization. This narrative is a largely religious one, and it has resonated with a significant portion of the population, especially since the Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei both declared nuclear weapons to be forbidden by Islam. We tested this religious-based hypothesis against a set of other hypotheses drawn from the literature about which values might shape demand for nuclear weapons.
The results of our analysis proved very instructive. A significant minority of Iranians are willing to state that they would like their country to develop nuclear weapons, but most Iranians express opposition to nuclear weapons. This set of findings, which corresponds well with previous opinion research on Iran, shows that there is a fairly strong basis of support for the Iranian government's asserted position on the nuclear energy issue. This is important for understanding Iranian foreign policy, at least in the near term. It means that there is little downside for the Iranian government in taking an assertive stance on nuclear energy, at least as far as domestic politics are concerned. In fact, this posture may be a significant means of bolstering support for the regime. If the public is enthusiastic about the idea of Iran energetically pursuing its right to a civilian nuclear program, the Iranian government has a strong incentive to do so. This is particularly true if the international community cannot impose sanctions that tip the cost-benefit calculus in the opposite direction for the Iranian government (although this may be changing). As we know, governments will often use foreign policy issues that they know will generate support from their populace to distract that populace from domestic problems or weaknesses in the government. While public opinion is likely not driving the Iranian government on the issue of its nuclear policy, it is likely bolstering the intransigence of the Iranian government in continuing to pursue its nuclear program.
The results of our analysis of the factors that drive some Iranians to support the idea of Iran developing nuclear weapons indicate that the national elite discourse explanation proved most predictive of Iranian views on developing nuclear weapons. Specifically, the perception of the Islamic legitimacy of developing nuclear weapons in Islam is the most important factor shaping support for this policy option.
This finding has significance for our understanding of the factors that influence foreign policy opinions held by the public. In religious societies, the opinions and edicts of religious authorities can have a large impact on the positions that segments of the public take on foreign policy issues. While this may not be true in all societies, especially largely secular societies, it is potentially quite important in societies with deeply religious publics.
While this research was able to give us important insights into how Iranians think about the development of nuclear weapons and why they hold those opinions, there is much more to be learned about the relationship between Iranian religious views and opinions on security issues. There has been a spate of recent research that has explored how particular religious views affect how individuals think about security affairs and conflict. Unfortunately the available data did not allow this study to go much beyond the specific question of the legitimacy of nuclear weapons in Islam. Scholars have explored many questions at the nexus of religion and security, such as how religious views affect perspectives on international politics, the use of violence to protect the religion or to help others, and the legitimacy of weapons of mass destruction (beyond the Iranian context). 48 One of the most important findings of this body of research is that the more authoritative the religious figure who takes a stance on a particular foreign policy issue, the more likely that stance is to be adopted by the religious faithful. This is clearly the case in Iran, where the chief cleric in the country came out against nuclear weapons development and most of the public seems to adhere to this view. This research seems to be one more piece of evidence that religion should be considered an important variable in many worldviews. 49 The perception of other nations as threats proved to be the second most important explanation of the distribution of views on developing nuclear weapons in Iran; specifically, those who believe that there are countries with secret nuclear programs are more likely to support Iran's development of nuclear weapons. This is also an operationalization of the international trust core foreign policy value and an indication that a citizen's perception of international threat is a factor conditioning whether she wants her country to develop nuclear weapons. Thus, the demand for nuclear weapons, at least at the level of the mass public, is driven, to some extent, by how worried one is that other countries are developing weapons that could be used against one's own country. Still, in the Iranian case, a sense of threat was trumped as a predictor of views on weaponization by views on the religious legitimacy of nuclear weapons.
Perhaps just as important as determining what drives the demand for nuclear weapons is determining
what does not condition that demand. The results of this study give no support for the hypothesis that the perceived morality of the use of violence to further the national interest conditions attitudes toward nuclear weapons. Also, the study finds that an Iranian's sense of threat from the U.S., namely the belief that the U.S. is out to humiliate Islam, that its bases in the Middle East pose a threat to Iran, or that the U.S. may attack Iran's nuclear sites, does not condition support for the development of nuclear weapons. This finding is particularly important because it seems to indicate the Iranian public may not see the United States to be as great a threat as the Iranian regime does.
Overall, what type of a picture does this analysis paint of Iranian mass public views on nuclear weapons? A very important point to make from the results is they indicate that very general respondent predispositions seem to drive a great deal of the variation we see among Iranian responses to the survey items. The fact that there was little reference to Iran's tangible external security threats, such as U.S. bases in the Mideast or fears of a U.S. attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, indicate the Iranian mass public, like just about any other mass public, uses very general cues to determine the stances they take on foreign policy issues. Cues from elites are particularly important.
What implications do these findings have for the policies of countries trying to halt Iran's suspected nuclear weapons program? The findings of this study seem to offer cause for some pessimism and optimism about Iran's nuclear program. A reason for pessimism is that it appears that, since Iranians, in large numbers, support the government's stance on developing nuclear energy (in the face of sanctions and the threat of an Israeli strike), Iranian public opinion cannot be used to shift the Iranian government from its present intransigence regarding its nuclear weapons program. That said, a majority of Iranians do not want their government to develop nuclear weapons and believe that to do so would be to violate the precepts of Islam.
As long as the top clerics in Iran stand by the position that nuclear weapons are forbidden by Islam, the majority of the mass public in Iran should continue to oppose the development of such weapons. 2) How likely do you think it is that the United States will take military action against Iran's nuclear facilities in the next year or two? not at all (0), not very (1), somewhat (2), or very (3).
3) How many countries do you think have secret programs for developing capacity to produce nuclear weapons? none (0), a few (1), some (2), and many (3).
4) How much, if at all, do you think U.S. bases in the Middle East are a threat to Iran? not at all a threat (0), a minor threat (1), some threat (2), and a major threat (3).
H (2): Iranians who support the use of force to further Iranian national interests will be more likely to support developing nuclear weapons. Is it your opinion that producing nuclear weapons is or is not against the principles of Islam? is not (0), Islam has no position on WMDs (1), is (2). 
